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Notes
Tax Effect of Executor's Rescission and
Renegotiation of Decedent's Contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
Under section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code, a decedent's property acquires a stepped-up basis equal to its fair
market value at date of death.' However, if the decedent had2
encumbered the property with an unperformed contract of sale
which is fully performed after his death, the stepped-up basis
provision is inapplicable. 3 Instead, the recipient of the contract
proceeds must recognize section 691 "gross income in respect of
a decedent" 4 in an amount equivalent 5 to that which decedent
1. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(a). An optional valuation
date may be elected under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032.
2. An unperformed contract of sale, as used in this Note, refers
to a written and signed agreement to sell property under which the
purchase price has not been paid, and neither title nor possession transferred to the buyer. The determination of when the gain on the sale
accrues is not within the scope of this Note. Generally, a gain from a
sale of real estate is not recognized until the transaction is closed. For
tax purposes, this means delivery of the deed, possession by purchaser,
or payment to seller. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11
See 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAxATIoN § 12.119
(1930).
(1961 rev.); SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 630-32 (1960
ed.). Moreover, under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 451(b), income is not
accrued solely by reason of death.
3. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(c). Using various theories,
several authors have argued against applying this treatment to sales of
capital assets. See Krieg & Buschmann, Section 126: "Items of Gross
Income in Respect of A Decedent . . .," 32 TAXES 651 (1954); Scott, A
Critique of Section 126, 26 TAxEs 127 (1948); Note, Income in Respect of
Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1024 (1952). However, it is accepted now that there is no exclusion from § 691 for capital
sales. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 941 (1960 ed.);
'Craven, Taxation of Income of Decedents, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 185, 212
(1953); Gordon, "Income in Respect of a Decedent" and Sales Transactions, 1961 WAsm U.L.Q. 30, 34.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 691(a) (1).
General rule-The amount of all items of gross income in respect of a decedent which are not properly includible in respect
of the taxable period in which falls the date of his death or a
prior period . . . shall be included in the gross income, for the
taxable year when received of:
(A) the estate of the decedent, if the right to receive the
amount is acquired by the decedent's estate from the decedent;
(B) the person who, by reason of the death of the decedent,
acquires the right to receive the amount, if the right to receive
the amount is not acquired by the decedent's estate from the
decedent; or
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would have recognized had he lived to receive the proceeds.0
If the property has a high market value in relation to decedent's
low basis, the resulting gain imposes a heavy tax burden on the
estate or successor in interest.7 This tax burden may be avoided
if a new basis for the property could be obtained by rescinding
the old contract and reselling the property by further negotiations. This possible savings is illustrated as follows:
Sales Price
Decedent's Basis
Fair Market Value
at Date of Death

Fair Market Value of Contract s
Other Estate Assets

$250,000
$ 50,000
$250,000
Contract
Rescinded:
New Contract
Contract
Negotiated
Performed
$250,000
$250,000
70,000
70,000

Gross Estate

$320,000

$320,000

Estate Tax 9
Capital Gains Tax on
Contract Proceeds' 0

$ 65,700

$ 65,700

TOTAL TAX

$103,525

37,825

-0$ 65,700

(C) the person who acquires from the decedent the right to
receive the amount by bequest, devise, or inheritance, if the
amount is received after a distribution by the decedent's estate
of such right.
(3)
[T]he amount includible in gross income under paragraph
(1) or (2) shall be considered in the hands of the estate or such
person to have the character which it would have had in the
hands of the decedent if the decedent had lived and received
such amount.
5. The recipient is given a deduction against the amount of income he reports for that portion of the estate tax attributable to the
right to receive the amount. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 691(c).
6. The tax on the income may not be the same for the recipient as
it would have been for decedent since their respective tax brackets may
differ.
7. If an estate distributes the right to income before the proceeds
are collected, it does not pay a tax on the transfer; only the distributee
includes the receipts in his gross income. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
691(a) (2).
8. Where the contract is subsequently performed, the fair market
value of the contract right rather than the property is included in the
estate assets. However, if the contract is rescinded after death the reverse may be true. For the purposes of this Note, however, it is assumed
that the two values coincide.
9. In arriving at the taxable estate a specific exemption of $60,000
was allowed, and allowable deductions of $10,000 were taken. See INT.
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The purpose of this Note is to determine the availability of
this rescission-renegotiation procedure within the present federal
tax structure. Three considerations bear upon the question of
favorable tax recognition. First, the rescission itself must not
be considered a taxable transfer within the meaning of section
691 (a) (2). Secondly, the proceeds of the newly negotiated contract must not be deemed "income in respect of a decedent"
under section 691 (a) (1). Finally, the rescission must not cause
the original purchaser to recognize discharge of indebtedness
income."
II. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO THE ESTATE OR SUCCESSOR
IN INTEREST
A. RESCISSION

AS A TRANSFER WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION

691 (a) (2)
Although it is probably constitutional to impose an income
tax upon a seller of property at the time he enters into the
contract of sale,12 the taxable event, or time of "realization of
income," is usually postponed to a later part of the transaction.' 3 Accordingly, Congress has chosen two events as the time
of realization of income from the contracts of a decedent. One
such event is the receipt, by the estate or successor in interest,
of the contract proceeds; 14 the other event occurs when the
estate "transfers" the right to receive the proceeds by a "sale,
exchange or other disposition."' 5 If the executor rescinds
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2051-55. The tax was computed without considering the effect of credits allowed by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2011-14.
10. Tax on the $200,000 capital gain is calculated by first deducting
the estate tax deduction of $58,700, and then using the alternative tax
method. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 691(C), 1201. The estate tax
deduction is the difference between the tax on the gross estate, including
the contract of sale, and the tax on the gross estate excluding the contract of sale.
The taxpayer was assumed to be a widower; when the marital deduction of a spouse is involved, complications as to the § 691(c) deduction arise. For an explanation of how to maximize the § 691 (c)deduction when the marital deduction is involved, see Ferrari, Income in
Respect of a Decedent: Deductions, Capital Gains, and Double Deductions, N.Y.U. 23rd INsT. ON FED. TAX 1209 (1965). See also, Treas. Reg.

§ 1.691(c)-i, ex. 1 (1957).
11. See INT. REv. CODE

OF 1954, § 61(a) (12).
12. See Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal
Revenue Code, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 84 (1952); Griswold, In Brief Reply, 65
HARv.L. REV. 1389 (1952).

13. See id. at 87.

14. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 691(a) (1).
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 691(a) (2).
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rather than performs the contract, the rescission may be a taxable "disposition" of the right to receive the proceeds under
section 691 (a) (2).16
Arguably, however, rescission is not a type of "transfer"
Congress intended as a taxable transaction. Clearly, the section is aimed at preventing a possible loss of tax revenue by
a mere transfer of the right to receive such income. This purpose is accomplished legislatively in much the same way that
tax revenue was preserved judicially in the assignment of
income cases, 17 i.e., by taxing the transferor rather than the
transferee, since the transferor received a "benefit" by reason
of his original possession of the right.1 8 Where this right to
receive income is cancelled, rather than donated or sold, the
estate has received no benefit from its mere possession of the
right; therefore, rescission of the contract should not be considered a "transfer."
In an analogous situation, Congress has expressly elected
not to treat contract rescission as a taxable transaction. 9 Prior
to the enactment of section 1038 in 1964, if a seller repossessed
real property he had previously sold, he recognized a gain or
loss on the reacquisition.20 Congress, however, felt that the
seller would not be in any better position after the reacquisition
of the property than he was before the sale and that, conse16. Section 691(a) (2) provides that if the right
to receive an amount [of income with respect of a decedent] is
transferred by the estate ... there shall be included in the
gross income of the estate ... the fair market value of such
right ... plus the amount by which any consideration for the
transfer exceeds such fair market value....
The statute states that a transfer includes the "sale, exchange or other
disposition" of the right to income. If a rescission of the contract is
deemed to be a transfer within the meaning of this section the estate
would recognize, under a literal reading of the statute, ordinary gross
income equal to the fair market value of the contract right at the time
of the rescission. This treatment contrasts with that afforded the estate
if the contract is performed. In that situation the estate recognizes
capial gains income equal to what the decedent would have recognized
had he lived. See notes 1-6, supra.
17. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
18. "Thus, if the right to receive the income is disposed of, as by
gift, the donor must include the fair market value of such right in his
gross income, in view of his benefit from such right." S. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1942); 1942-2 Cumv. BuLL. 504, 581.
19. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1038. "Your committee does not
believe that merely because property originally held by a seller has been
restored to him should constitute grounds for taxing any appreciation
in value of this property to the seller at that time." S. REP. No. 1361,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964).
20. L. D. Codden & Bros., Inc., 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938).
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quently, it was desireable to treat the sale as a nullity.2 1 Accordingly, section 1038 reversed the prior treatment and enunciated a position commensurate with the traditional view that
22
rescission abrogates the contract ab initio.

B. SUBSEQUENT

CONTRACT OF SALE AS INCOImE lN RESPECT OF A

DECEDENT
Assuming the rescission is not a transfer within the meaning of section 691 (a) (2), the proceeds of the newly negotiated
contract may nevertheless be taxable as "income in respect of a
decedent" within the meaning of section 691 (a) (1). For this
section to be applicable, the income must in some manner have
21. Apart from any payments he may have received, he actually is in no better position than he was before he made the
sale. As a result, your committee has concluded that instead of
the repossession of the property being treated as a second sale
of the property back to its original holder, it is desirable to
consider instead that the first sale has been nullified.
S. REP.No. 1361, supra note 19, at 5.
22. Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R.I. 332, 128 Atl. 217 (1925). In Ripley
Realty Co., 23 B.T.A. 1247, affd per curium, 61 F.2d 1038 (1932), the taxpayer sought to have his settlement payments on a breach of contract
suit reflected in his prior tax calculation of the sale. The court refused
because the suit was for damages, inferring that if it had been suit for
rescission the prior sale would have been voided ab initio.
The courts have faced a similar issue when trying to determine if
contract cancellation payments resulted from a sale or exchange within
the meaning of the capital gains sections of the Code. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1222. Unfortunately, the decisions are in conflict. See Chirelstein, Capital Gain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The Income
Tax Treatment of Contract Termination Payments, 49 MniN. L. REV. 1,
10 (1964). Those courts which have found a sale or exchange base the
result on the theory that rights have been transferred between the parties. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954). See generally 56 1MhcH. L. REV. 1370 (1958).
Other courts say there has been no exchange between parties, rather
their respective rights or duties under the contract have been extinguished. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1958); Marc D. Leh, 27 T.C. 892, aff'd, 260 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1958). An
examination of the factors underlying these decisions does not reconcile the confusion in a way to give a concrete definition to the phrase
"sale or exchange" for interpreting the scope of section 691(a) (2). See
generally Eustice, ContractRights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAx L. REv. 1 (1964); Note, Capital Gains:
Can the Confusion Be Eliminated, 49 IowA L. REV. 89 (1963); Note, The
Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and Ordinary Income, 73
YALE L.J. 691 (1964).
The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that a surrender of simple contract rights is not a sale or exchange of capital assets.
Rev. Rul. 531, 1956-2 Cum. BUL. 983. This position was reaffirmed in
Rev. Rul. 394, 1958-2 Cum. BuL. 374.
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resulted from the decedent's activities. 23 In the leading case
of Commissioner v. Linde24 the court specified several factors
as determinative of respectiveness: (1) the amounts were realized under and in consequence of contracts and deals made by
the decedent; (2) no act or thing taken or performed by the
taxpayer (decedent's heir) operated to procure or to give rise
to the amount; and (3) the payments had their source exclu25
sively in the decedent's contract and arrangement.
In addition to the above factors, consideration must be given
to attacks on the rescission-renegotiation procedure as a tax
avoidance scheme. 26 Predicting judicial reactions in the tax
avoidance area is difficult; 27 the opinions are myriad and provide
no discernible standards.28 When the courts use such terms as
"sham transaction," 29 "step-transaction," 30 lack of "business purpose," 3' 1 and "substance over form,' 3 2 they are stating conclusions, not guidelines for the practitioner.3 3 In conflict are the
two broad propositions lying at either end of the tax policy
spectrum. On the one hand is the idea that a taxpayer has the
right to decrease the amount of his taxes, or altogether avoid
them, by any means which the law permits. 34 On the other
23. Davison's Estate v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 939 (1961); O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir.
1949); Gordon, supra note 3, at 36; Olincy, Income in Respect of Decedent, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 859 (1965); Note, Income in Respect of Decedents: The Scope of Section 126, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1024, 1027 (1952).
24. 213 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1954).
25. Id. at 4.
26. "Tax Minimization Plan" is a better advocate's term. One author draws a distinction between tax minimization, tax avoidance, and
tax evasion for analytical purposes. Lesser, Business Purpose Revisited,
14 U. So. CAL. 1962 TAX INsT. 513. However, no court has indicated
acceptance of such a distinction.
27. See PAUL, STUDIEs IN FEDERAL TAXATION 74 (1937); see generally Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MyIcH.
L. REV. 1021 (1953).
28. See Rice, supra note 27.
29. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960); Bridges v.
Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180, 182 (4th Cir. 1963).
30. Du Pont v. Deputy, 23 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D. Del. 1938).
31. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Aldon Homes,
Inc., 33 T.C. 582, 597 (1959).
32. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 404 (2d Cir. 1957). In
his dissent in Gilbert, L. Hand, J., set out the "beneficial interest"
doctrine which was later partially accepted by the Supreme Court in
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). See Blum, Knetsch v.
United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 SU'. CT. REV.
135.
33. See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 27, at 93; Summers, A Critique
of the Business-Purpose Doctrine, 41 ORE. L. REV. 38, 45 (1961).
34. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Guterman, Sub-
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is the idea that the public is best served through the collection
of the maximum tax under the law, and that no taxpayer
should be able to avoid paying his share by means of chicanery
and subterfuge. 35 Beyond these statements, generalization becomes hazardous.
The factors espoused in Linde suggest that the necessary element of respectiveness would not be present in a situation
where the executor negotiates a contract of sale with someone
other than the original purchaser. In such a case the new contract would be the consequence of the executor's activities
rather than those of the decedent.
The most likely tax avoidance attack upon the rescissionrenegotiation procedure in such an instance is the lack of a
"business purpose." 3 6 Although no business purpose is required explicitly by sections 691 or 1014, this general doctrine
arose and has continued as a judicial interpretation of con37
gressional intent.
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the purposes behind
these two statutes to see if they embody a business purpose requirement for purposes of our hypothetical. Section 691 is
designed to prevent the loss of taxes, solely by reason of
death, on income created by the decedent's activities but not
yet realizable by him under our tax structure. 38 On the other
hand, section 1014 excludes from taxation the appreciation in
value of the decedent's property which he had not attempted
to realize by affirmative acts. 39 Therefore, it is the activity
of the decedent in relation to the accumulated value, rather
than the motive of the executor, which determines the applicable statute. Since in our hypothetical it is the executor
who bargains for rescission of the old contract, seeks a different purchaser, and negotiates a new contract, it should be
immaterial that his sole reason for doing so is to obtain a tax
stance v. Form in the Taxation of Personal and Business Transactions, N.Y.U. 20TH

INST. ON FED.

TAX 951 (1962).

Quite often when

the courts reiterate this policy, they also state that the taxpayer's

tax avoidance motive is irrelevant; however, an examination of the
opinions reveals that his state of mind is the primary determinate in
close cases. See Lesser, supra note 26, at 521.

35. See Doyle v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 654, 659 (7 Cir. 1961).

36. See Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuL. L. REV. 355, 360

(1963).
37.

See Lesser, supra note 26, at 543; Rice, supra note 27, at 1041-46.

38. See authorities cited at note 23 supra.
39. 3A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 21.67 (1958).
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savings. 40 But for the existence of the contract made by the
decedent, the executor could have performed the same activities
and obtained the benefit of the tax savings afforded by section
1014.41

By this analysis, it should not matter whether the execu-

tor is able to obtain a more favorable contract, or that the
original purchaser is unable or unwilling to perform, both of
which are necessary to establish a "business purpose."
A possible variation in the above transaction which might
cause a further problem is the existence of prior dealing between the decedent and the second purchaser concerning the
same or similar property. This prior connection of the decedent
with the new purchaser would revitalize the respectiveness
argument. However, in a somewhat analogous situation, the
Internal Revenue Service has ruled that some type of contract
or arrangement which puts the property beyond the dominion
and control of the decedent must be in existence for there to be
section 691 income. 42 For example, if a farmer dies leaving unharvested wheat which he had not formally disposed of, the
executor should be free to sell the crop to the same buyer with
whom the decedent had always dealt without realizing income in
respect of the decedent.
Rarely, however, will the property be so readily marketable
43
that the executor would want to risk finding a new buyer.
Nor will the purchaser be willing to waive his contract rights
without some assurance of a later opportunity to obtain the
property at a similar price.4 4 Consequently, the only alternative
will probably be to deal with the original purchaser. In this
40. In his section entitled Restatement of Tax Avoidance, Paul
argues that if the steps taken were part of a real transaction, and the
facts proved are enough, as a matter of law, to constitute a basis for
avoidance, then the taxpayer's motive is immaterial and will not negate
the effect of the transaction. PAUL, op. cit. supra note 27, at 152.
41. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
42. Rev. Rul. 436, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 366. See also Gordon, supra

note 3, at 37; Young, Tax Treatment o"Real Estate Contracts Outstanding at the Vendor's Death, 42 ILL. B.J. 50 (1953) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.691 (a) 2(b), ex. (5) (1) (1957).
43. There may be a breach of fiduciary duty if the executor rescinds a profitable contract without being able to secure a similarly
favorable arrangement.
44. This reluctance suggests an informal agreement whereby the
third party would convey the property to the original purchaser after
the executor had obtained a stepped-up basis. Such conduit schemes
fail so often, however, that it is not necessary to discuss their relative
merits and demerits. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935);
United States v. Kyle, 242 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1957); Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 15 T.C. 544 (1950).
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situation, there is a more intimate tie-in with the decedent's
activities. This element of respectiveness, coupled with the
liberal judicial construction of the "right to receive income" provision, 45 increases the difficulty of escaping section 691 treatment. However, the primary obstacles in such cases will be the
tax avoidance arguments.
One of the primary tax avoidance arguments is the doctrine of "substance over form."40 Assume the executor and
purchaser agree to rescind the old contract in consideration of
a new contract of sale on the same terms. In form, the executor
will be trying, by means of a legal paper, to sever the decedent's
activity. In other words, he will so substantially inject his
presence in the relationship with the purchaser that the contract
of sale becomes his product, not the decedent's. In substance,
what happens is nothing more than a substitution of sellers'
names in the contract. The statute itself performs such a substitution by treating the right to receive the sale proceeds "as
if [they] had been acquired by the estate ... in the transaction in which the right to receive the income was originally
derived . . . ."47 That is, the estate is put in the decedent's
shoes for purposes of taxation. 48 Thus, it is clear that mere
form alone is not enough to alter the transaction and produce
a tax benefit.
To inject more than mere form into the transaction, the
sales price could be lowered, in effect paying the purchaser for
rescinding the old contract. Such a rescission-renegotiation
technique is subject, however, to the pervasive doctrine announced in Knetsch v. United States.49 In that case, the Supreme Court denied the effectiveness of a taxpayer's transaction
because it did not appreciably alter his beneficial interest except
to reduce his tax. One authority" has tried to catergorize this
51
test by saying that any form of transaction, not a sham, which
is motivated exclusively by tax savings and not supported by
non-tax factors, may be discarded for tax purposes. Some re45. See authorities cited at note 23 supra.
46. See 5 P-H 1966 FED. TAX SFav. 1 41001.
47.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 691(a) (3).

48. See Young, supra note 42, at 52.
49. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
50. Guterman, supra note 34.
51. Lesser uses the term "sham" with reference to transactions
which are blatantly unreal as in Haggard v. Wood, 298 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1961). See Lesser, supra note 26. However, the courts paint a broader
stroke with the term. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361
(1960); see Rice, supra note 27.
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deeming non-tax factors are: (1) an opportunity for profit other
than from tax savings; (2) presence of a risk of loss in excess of
the possible tax advantages (this does not refer to a loss before
taxes deliberately incurred to obtain an after-tax profit);
(3) the economic reality of the transaction (sometimes called
a business purpose); and, (4) the normality of the forms em52
ployed.
Viewed in this light, the success of the new contract is
doubtful. The reduction in price, while creating a new right to
income in the technical sense, is in reality a built-in loss incurred solely to secure a tax gain. 53 Because the transaction is
not supported by any non-tax factors, the respectiveness to the
54
decedent should remain intact.
If the purchaser agrees to rescind the old contract for consideration, and the new contract is not executed until a latter
date, there is a better chance of success. The delay between the
rescission and the new contract date arguably gives rise to certain non-tax factors. During this time the estate must bear the
risks of ownership, such as a possible rise or decline in the
market value of the property, the chance of partial or total loss
through destruction, and the burden of paying property taxes
and insurance. Such factors might convince a court that the
estate has earned an increased basis, even though its net proceeds from the transaction are no different than they were in
the previous fact situation. This result implies that the presence
of non-tax factors will make the taxpayer's motive irrelevant, a
position that has been taken by several authorities 5 and some
courts.5 6
Nevertheless, there is a danger that prearranging a delay to
obtain the resulting benefits may cause a court to revert to the
52. See Guterman, supra note 34, at 952.
53. The taxpayer in Knetsch also had a built-in loss; however, his
tax gain would have more than compensated him. See Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 1963). But cf. John Loughran, 19
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1193 (1960).
54. The estate would include in its gross income only the amount
of gain actually received, not the amount which would have been realized under the original contract. However, the estate tax deduction is
figured on the lesser amount rather than on the value of the contract
that had been taxed as an estate asset.
55. See Guterman, supra note 33; Lesser, supra note 26, at 543.
56. See Stone v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1966); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1962); Fabreeka Prods. Co.
v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876, 878 (1st Cir. 1961); Maysteel Prods., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1961).
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"step-transaction" doctrine. 57 This is but another aspect of the
"substance over form" argument. 58 In applying it, the courts
hold that the tax consequences turn upon the end result, and
disregard the intervening steps. 59 A transaction is viewed as
comprehending a series of many occurrences, depending not so
much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their
logical relationship. 60 In the instant case, the end result of the
transaction is essentially the same as in the previous situation
where a new contract was written with a reduced sales price.
A court might conclude, therefore, that both cases should be
treated in the same manner-that is, the estate would not receive a stepped-up basis for the property. However, to the extent that the length of time between rescission and renegotiation
is increased, courts would be more reluctant to apply the "steptransaction" doctrine because of the incidence of non-tax factors.
III. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO ORIGINAL PURCHASER
One remaining problem with the rescission-renegotiation
procedure is that the original purchaser, because of the rescission of the old contract, may realize discharge of indebtedness
income."'
If the original purchaser is not a party to the new contract
and did not receive any consideration for rescinding the old contract, no section 61 income should be attributed to him. He has
given up his right to the property in exchange for a release of
his payment obligation. Assumedly, the value of this obligation
is the same as the fair market value of the property; therefore,
his economic position is not improved and no income should
62
result.
57. See Jockmus v. United States, 335 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1964). However, the tax motive alone may not be strong enough to defeat the
transaction if the taxpayer bears enough hardships. See Commissioner
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965) (a bootstrap acquisition of taxpayer's
property by a charitable organization); 79 HARv. L. REV. 206 (1965).
58.

See Donaldson,
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is

Available to the Taxpayer, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 41, 43 (1964).
59. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938); 3 -RTExs,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.161 (1965 rev.).
60. Du Pont v. Deputy, 23 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.Del. 1938).
61. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a) (12).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1957). Under this regulation, if the
market value of the property is less than the value of the obligation, the
purchaser would realize income in the amount of the difference between
the two values. Likewise, if the purchaser receives consideration for
rescinding the old contract he is in effect giving up a lesser value and
will realize income.
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Where the original purchaser is a party to the new contract
of sale, it is necessary to focus upon the "purchase price adjustment" exception to the discharge of indebtedness ruleA3 Under
this exception, the debtor will not realize income provided he
still owns the property and the fair market value of the property
after the reduction of the purchase price is not in excess of the
reduced debt.6 4 In the case where the purchaser in effect gets a
reduction in the sales price, the market value of the property
would be greater than the reduced debt. Consequently, the exception would not apply and the purchaser would realize income
in an amount equal to the entire difference between the face
amount of the new debt and the fair market value of the
property. 5
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the rescission itself is probably not a "transfer"
within the meaning of section 691 (a) (2), the proceeds of a subsequent contract are probably income in respect of a decedent
under section 691(a)(1) as a consequence of the application of
one of several tax avoidance doctrines. However, the application
of these doctrines depends upon the specific rescission-renegotiation technique used by the executor. If the executor must deal
with the original purchaser, he can increase his chances of success by a rescission for value and a subsequent resale at a later
date. If, however, the executor finds a new purchaser, he may
be able to avoid adverse tax consequences. Obviously there
are possible situations other than those set out which might
alter the results indicated. For example, if it is the original
purchaser who takes the initiative in rescinding the old contract
because he is insolvent or desires a lower price, then, since tax
avoidance would not be the doninant motivation, any new contract should be respected.6 6 This situation also illustrates the
63. See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940);
Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A
Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REV. 225, 244-46 (1959);
Greenbaum, Income from Debt Cancellation and Reduction, N.Y.U. 19T
INsT. FED. TAX 53, 66-67 (1961); Sanders, Debt Cancellation-Without
Realization of Income, 11 U. So. CAL. 1959 TAx INsT. 565, 575-77.

64. See Sanders, supra note 63, at 575-76.
65. Ibid.
66. Generally, the courts hold that if a taxpayer has two alternate
routes to follow, there is no duty to choose the one which will produce
the highest tax. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Nassau Lens
Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1962). To punish a taxpayer for his choice arguably would undercut the legislative design in
providing him an alternative. See Blum, supra note 32, at 154 n.64.
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importance of ascertaining all the relevant facts and presenting
them in the manner best suited to soothing the court's attitude
67
on tax avoidance.
The judicial skepticism toward the meaning urged by a taxavoiding taxpayer6" is doubly enforced in the situations discussed in the text. A court faces two statutes, fairly clear in
their meaning and not dependent on form for their application,
and a taxpayer who by form is trying to escape the burdens
of one and reap the benefits of the other. Nevertheless, the lack
of any definable tax avoidance theory leaves elbow room for
the advocate.

67. See Blum, supra note 32, at 140-41.
68. See PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 27, at 153.

